Russia’s A7 Builds a State-Linked Payments Network Beyond Western Sanctions
The two-year-old platform says it handles almost one-fifth of Russia’s foreign-trade payments, while Western governments accuse it of helping Moscow bypass financial restrictions through crypto and opaque settlement channels.
A7, a Russian cross-border payments platform created less than two years ago, has emerged as a major conduit for trade that cannot easily move through the Western financial system.
The company says it now handles almost 20% of payments connected to Russia’s foreign trade, a claim that would place annual flows above $100bn, although the figure has not been independently audited.
The platform was formed in 2024 with backing from Promsvyazbank, Russia’s state-owned defence-sector lender.
A7 is majority-owned by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan businessman who was convicted in Moldova in a major banking-fraud case and is subject to Western sanctions.
Promsvyazbank remains a significant shareholder, linking the network directly to a Russian bank already sanctioned for its role in financing the country’s defence sector.
A7’s business is built around helping Russian companies settle cross-border transactions outside conventional banking channels.
It uses a mix of traditional payment arrangements, intermediaries, bills of exchange and digital assets.
Its ruble-linked stablecoin, A7A5, has been used in transactions exceeding $100bn in cumulative on-chain volume, though that figure is not the same as verified foreign-trade turnover and does not show the purpose of every payment.
The platform has become a focus of Western sanctions policy because officials in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union say networks of this kind can help Russia continue to import restricted goods and move money despite measures imposed over the war in Ukraine.
Authorities have sanctioned A7 and entities linked to its cryptocurrency operations, as well as some associated companies in third countries.
The alleged system works by making transactions harder to trace and disrupt.
Payments can move through firms in jurisdictions outside Russia, be converted into digital tokens or foreign currency, and be settled through accounts that do not directly connect a Russian buyer with an overseas seller.
Such structures can also be used for legitimate trade, but regulators say they create opportunities to conceal sanctioned activity.
A7 portrays itself as a lawful alternative to Western-dominated payment infrastructure and has pursued expansion beyond Russia, including in Africa.
Its rise reflects a wider Russian strategy to reduce dependence on the dollar, the euro and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, known as SWIFT, after sanctions restricted access to parts of the global banking system.
The central uncertainty is the true scale and composition of A7’s activity.
What is confirmed is that it has become large enough to attract coordinated sanctions and that its associated A7A5 token has processed substantial volumes.
A7 and related cryptocurrency services remain targets of British and European measures intended to limit Russia’s ability to finance cross-border trade outside conventional banking channels.
The company says it now handles almost 20% of payments connected to Russia’s foreign trade, a claim that would place annual flows above $100bn, although the figure has not been independently audited.
The platform was formed in 2024 with backing from Promsvyazbank, Russia’s state-owned defence-sector lender.
A7 is majority-owned by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan businessman who was convicted in Moldova in a major banking-fraud case and is subject to Western sanctions.
Promsvyazbank remains a significant shareholder, linking the network directly to a Russian bank already sanctioned for its role in financing the country’s defence sector.
A7’s business is built around helping Russian companies settle cross-border transactions outside conventional banking channels.
It uses a mix of traditional payment arrangements, intermediaries, bills of exchange and digital assets.
Its ruble-linked stablecoin, A7A5, has been used in transactions exceeding $100bn in cumulative on-chain volume, though that figure is not the same as verified foreign-trade turnover and does not show the purpose of every payment.
The platform has become a focus of Western sanctions policy because officials in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union say networks of this kind can help Russia continue to import restricted goods and move money despite measures imposed over the war in Ukraine.
Authorities have sanctioned A7 and entities linked to its cryptocurrency operations, as well as some associated companies in third countries.
The alleged system works by making transactions harder to trace and disrupt.
Payments can move through firms in jurisdictions outside Russia, be converted into digital tokens or foreign currency, and be settled through accounts that do not directly connect a Russian buyer with an overseas seller.
Such structures can also be used for legitimate trade, but regulators say they create opportunities to conceal sanctioned activity.
A7 portrays itself as a lawful alternative to Western-dominated payment infrastructure and has pursued expansion beyond Russia, including in Africa.
Its rise reflects a wider Russian strategy to reduce dependence on the dollar, the euro and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, known as SWIFT, after sanctions restricted access to parts of the global banking system.
The central uncertainty is the true scale and composition of A7’s activity.
What is confirmed is that it has become large enough to attract coordinated sanctions and that its associated A7A5 token has processed substantial volumes.
A7 and related cryptocurrency services remain targets of British and European measures intended to limit Russia’s ability to finance cross-border trade outside conventional banking channels.
