Thailand is confronting a severe demographic inflection point: in 2024 the country recorded only 462,240 births — the lowest in 75 years — as births fall far below historic levels and mortality surpasses fertility.

This sudden plunge intensifies long-standing ageing pressures and casts doubt on Thailand’s capacity to sustain growth and public finances.

The 2024 birth total marks the first time that births dipped below half a million since 1949, and continues a multi-year trend in which deaths have outweighed births.

The country’s total fertility rate has also collapsed to around one child per woman, placing Thailand among the lowest in Asia.

The ramifications are already evident across welfare, labour and fiscal domains.

Former Social Development Minister Varawut Silpa-archa has described the current situation as a “crisis within a crisis,” emphasising that the rapid birth decline compounds the challenges of an ageing society.

He warned that by 2033, nearly 28 percent of the population could be elderly, pushing Thailand into “super-aged” status sooner than many expect.

Rising dependency ratios underscore the peril.

In 2024, Thailand’s total dependency ratio reached 43.09 percent, up from 42.47 in 2023, meaning fewer working-age individuals are available to support children and the elderly alike.

Economists warn that this ratio will only worsen, squeezing labour supplies, eroding tax revenues, and shrinking domestic demand.

At the central bank, Assistant Governor Chayawadee Chai-Anant has cautioned that a growing retired cohort with lower consumption habits threatens broader economic vitality.

She stressed that unless the working population is sufficiently large, income growth, competitiveness, and public revenues will suffer.

Without urgent structural reforms, she said, Thailand risks being “dragged down” from its growth potential.

Leading banking figures are sounding similar alarms.

Kobsak Pootrakool of Bangkok Bank has described the ageing crisis as having reached a “critical” threshold and warned that unchecked expansion of welfare programmes may drive the state toward fiscal insolvency.

He argues that the government must sharply recalibrate welfare commitments, and avoid a reliance on indefinite subsidies that the state cannot sustain.

Economists at Kiatnakin Phatra and CIMB Thai similarly forecast growth headwinds stemming from a shrinking workforce.

Phiphat Luengnaruemitchai has noted the risk of smaller domestic markets, falling productivity, and reduced appeal to foreign investors.

Amonthep Chawla of CIMB Thai cautioned that Thailand may be heading down a path once taken by Japan, where demographic decline gradually erodes growth and income per capita, unless savings, investment and labour policy are reformed.

To buffer the fiscal burden of ageing, external analysis projects that the combined cost of public pensions, health care and old-age allowances could rise from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2020 to as much as 11.3 percent by 2060.

Thailand’s core challenge will be to simultaneously expand labour participation, restore fertility, and enhance productivity to offset mounting demographic headwinds.

In response, Thai research institutions and policymakers are exploring multidimensional strategies.

These include pilot “age-friendly” communities, policies to encourage later retirement, incentives for childbearing, foreign labour liberalisation, and investments in automation and high-value sectors.

But with demographic momentum already accelerating, the window for decisive, integrated reform is narrowing fast.